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490 家（占 77.9%）民营上市公司为金字塔结构。 终控制人平均以 29.06%的现
金流权掌握了 36.80%的控制权，两权分离现象明显，但也存在两权不分离的金




























































Pyramid structure is a special configuration of ownership structure around the 
world, ultimate controllers (or ultimate controlling family) usually builds complicated 
business group by using pyramid structure and expropriates the interests of other 
medium and small shareholders. In recent years, pyramid structure research has 
attracted the close attentions of scholars and increasingly become a hot topic. 
According to the literatures, pyramid structure is considered as a exogenous variable 
which generates the economic consequence, just a few of them focus on the cause of 
pyramid structure and there are also poor systematic studies of Chinese private 
pyramid structure based on the macroeconomic institutional environment. This 
dissertation aims to deeply study the private pyramid structure in China, so as to make 
up deficiency of existing literature to some extent. The significances of this research 
are enhancing understanding of pyramid structure and providing reference about 
improving the corporate governance of private listed companies. 
Based on related literature and analysis of the unique institutional background 
and the characteristic of pyramid structures in Chinese private listed companies, the 
author choose the three main fields of research: the cause of pyramid structure, the 
relationship between expropriation and pyramid structure and the value of private 
pyramid structure companies. After using theoretic analysis and empirical research , 
we form systemic conclusions and show some research implications. 
This paper consists of seven chapters. Major contents of each chapter are 
outlined as follow: 
Chapter 1 is the introduction, which briefly introduces the research background 
and research issues, research ideas and technique, research innovations, definition of 
keywords and overall framework. 
Chapter 2 is the literature review. In this chapter, the author reviews and 
comments on the literature about the cause of pyramid structure, the expropriation of 
ultimate controller and the relationship between ownership structure and firm value. 
Chapter 3 analyzes the unique institutional background and the characteristics of 
pyramid structures in Chinese private listed companies. In this chapter, the author 
sums up the development of private listed companies over the past four decades, 
















Chapter 4 empirically studies the cause of pyramid structure of private listed 
companies. Based on the institutional environment and the intrinsic factor of ultimate 
controllers (or ultimate controlling families), the author examines the relationships 
among pyramid structure characteristics (i.e., layer, chain and complexity) of private 
listed companies on IPO year and the institutional environment (i.e., legal 
environment, market environment and government intervention). 
Chapter 5 examines the relationships between pyramid structure and 
expropriation of ultimate controllers. Based on the governance mechanism and 
institutional environment, the author deeply analyze the influencing factors of 
ultimate controllers’ expropriation in pyramid structure and verifies the achievement 
of split-share reform in corporate governance. 
Chapter 6 empirical tests the relationships between pyramid structure and the 
value of private listed companies. From perspective of agency problem, the author 
examines the influence mechanism of pyramid structure characteristics on firm value 
(i.e., market value and accounting performance) and the interaction effect among 
pyramid structure characteristics. 
Chapter 7 summarizes the research findings and draws conclusions, shows the 
research implications and countermeasures, and points out the research limitations and 
the direction for future research. 
The main conclusions of this article are as follows: 
First, pyramid structures exist widely in Chinese private listed companies. Up to 
the end of 2009, there are 490 (accounts for 77.9%) private listed companies 
controlled by pyramid structures. The ultimate controllers own 29.06% of cash flow 
right to 36.8% of control right, which shows the great separation of ownership and 
control. Average number of layer is 2.251 and average number of chain is 1.424, 
which means the common pyramid structures consist of two layers and one chain. 
There are also multi-chain pyramid structures which controlled by different members 
from the same ultimate controlling family.  
Second, the institutional environment has significant effect on pyramid structure 
characteristics of private listed companies around their initial public offering time. In 
the areas which government intervention is severe, the number of layer and the 
complexity of pyramid structure are decreased, which shows the motivation of 















environment lowers the negative correlation between government intervention and 
pyramid structures. The number of chain is positively correlated with legal 
environment and market environment, the controlling families prefer to build 
multi-chain pyramid structures meeting their need of benefit distribution and 
intergenerational inheritance. In addition, a inverted U-shaped relationship, which 
existed between complexity and market enviroment, was also found between layer 
and market environment, demonstrates the combining effect of decentralization and 
financing constraints relieving. There is also a inverted U-shaped between pyramid 
structure and legal environment but only in the lower interval we can found the 
significance, the tunnelling and propping hypothesis was not fully verified. 
Third, in Chinese private listed companies which pyramid structures are 
universal existence, the relationships between direct shareholder structure and 
expropriation are not significant but the pyramid structure characteristics indeed have 
influence on ultimate controller’s expropriation. Governance mechanism (e.g., 
independent director) have no effect on expropriation. The split-share reform indeed 
improves public-trade firms’ governance and help to remove the confliction between 
the ultimate controllers’ benefits and other minority shareholders’ interests. In 
addition, the improvement of legal environment and marketization and the lower of 
government intervention will not only reduce the expropriation but also decrease the 
sensitivity between ownership-control separation and expropriation significantly. 
Fourth, pyramid structure characteristics (e.g., control right, cash flow right, 
separation between control and ownership, layer, chain) have significant influence on 
private listed companies’ value, and show different effects among market value 
(Tobin’Q) and accounting performance (ROA). In the special pyramids, which have 
no separation of control and ownership, these relationships are not significant. In 
addition, the pyramid structure characteristics have interaction effect, high control 
(expropriation power), low cash flow right (expropriation cost), more layer or chain 
(expropriation route) and more free cash flow (expropriation opportunity) exacerbate 
the negative correlation between control-ownership separation(expropriation incentive) 
and firm value. 
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治理所需要回答的核心问题（Shleifer and Vishny, 1997）。 














基于此，La porta 等人通过层层追溯界定了公司终极股东（即 终控制人）
                                                 
① Shleifer and Vishny（1986）对财富（Fouture）500 强（截止 1980 年 12 月）中 456 家公司的分析指出，
其中 354 公司至少有一个持股超过 5%的大股东，第一大股东的平均持股比例为 15.4%，将近一半（149 家）
的公司被家族所控制 。 
② 大量文献从经验研究的角度证实了这一现象的存在，如 Morck et al.（1988）、Holderness et al.（1999）。 
③ 虽然美国公司也存在大股东，但其平均持股比例在全球范围内来看是 低的，其次，经验研究表明金字
























的金字塔结构普遍存在（Khanna and Yafeh, 2007）。从影响力来看，东亚地区金
字塔集团上市公司的市值占到全部上市公司市值的 39%（Claessens et al., 2000），
在西欧这一比例为 19%（Faccio and Lang, 2002），在新兴市场国家，这一比例则
高达 42%（Khanna anf Yafeh, 2005）。加拿大的布朗夫曼家族（Bronfman）（Morck 
et al., 2000）、瑞典的瓦伦堡家族（Wallenbergs）（Hogfeldt and Svancar, 2001）、韩









riddle of the great pyramids）依然没有一个明确的答案（Morck, 2009）。几篇系
统的成因研究文献（Almeida and Wolfenzon, 2006; Riyanto and Toolsema, 2008; 
Almeida et al., 2011）大多是基于发达国家制度背景的分析，并无法对“新兴加转
轨”的中国上市公司金字塔结构做出合理解释。Fan et al.（2009）对我国国有金
                                                 
① 李德林（2004）列举了德隆集团对旗下上市公司的种种掏空行为，如将其下属公司新疆屯河的 9.96 亿资
产抵押套现，间接占用湘火炬资金 3.04 亿元，通过定期存单质押的方式占用合金投资 1.26 亿元等，这些肆
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